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ABSTRACT: The aim of this paper is to analyze the scientific approach to the ana-
lysis of political processes in Antonio Gramsci’s and Charles Tilly’s works. The at-
tempt to compare the work of two culturally different scholars may seem unortho-
dox, but it is not. Gramsci and Tilly are two thinkers working in different historical 
contexts and from different cultural perspectives, nevertheless their intellectual ela-
borations have several points of contact that allow us to build a theoretical frame-
work that may be useful for a systematic analysis of political change. Gramsci was 
a Marxist intellectual and political leader working in fascist Italy, in a context of 
crisis of democratic institutions; Tilly, on the contrary, was a liberal scholar work-
ing in the United States of the second half of the twentieth century, but both are u-
nited by a common attention to the dynamics of conflict and by their commitment 
to produce theories that might be rooted in historical processes. Scholarly attention 
has focused largely on the political originality of the work of Gramsci, yet, in our 
opinion, his categories may also be a useful analytical tool within a sociological 
framework. Gramsci, on the one hand, developed a critical attitude towards evolu-
tionistic and determinist conceptions of history by focusing on the historical relev-
ance of the collective will of popular masses in a dialectical relationship with the 
system of power. Tilly, on the other hand, reacted to the functionalistic and syn-
chronic sociology, which was in part a product of the Durkheimian structuralist ap-
proach, by focusing on the relevance of the elaboration of a historically grounded 
social theory. Both of them elaborated a theory in the study of contentious dynam-
ics by adopting a historical comparative methodology.  
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1. Two very different yet related scholars 
Comparing the intellectual output of two scholars is always a hard effort 
because you have to deal with the complexity of a thought expressed in its 
specificity. A fortiori, it is difficult to compare two historically and cultu-
rally different scholars. Specifically, the aim of this paper is to identify the 
connecting elements in the intellectual production of Antonio Gramsci and 
Charles Tilly, two authors who lived in different historical and social con-
texts and were, in many ways, culturally distant. Gramsci was a communist 
political leader who wrote from the cell into which he had been imprisoned 
by the Italian fascist regime between 1926 and 1937. Tilly, instead, operat-
ed in a democratic context, the United States, in the second half of the 
twentieth century. Whereas the first is mainly concerned with identifying 
the historical conditions for the construction of a revolutionary process in 
the West within a Marxist perspective, the latter is interested in studying 
social change starting from the phenomena of conflict and mobilization, but 
within a liberal democratic frame. Two authors seemingly incomparable 
but actually united by a common reaction to a certain evolutionistic sociol-
ogy that has its roots in the mechanicistic positivism of the nineteenth cen-
tury, culminating in the form of the structural-functionalist paradigm in the 
twentieth century. Both are interested in the dynamics of conflict expressed 
by an organized civil society that reacts to the dominant system of power. 
Both finally identify in history, and especially in historical comparison, a 
basic analytic tool for social scientists in the prospect of tracing some regu-
larities and limited generalizations. We will focus on these aspects of anal-
ogy, always trying to historically contextualize the thought and the intellec-
tual production of these two scholars.  
In order to understand the relevance of Antonio Gramsci’s social theory, it 
must be contextualized in the broader historical framework of theoretical 
Marxism. Strongly influenced at a young age by Antonio Labriola’s Marx-
ism (Badaloni 1975; Paggi 1979), Gramsci soon developed a critical attitu-
de towards the kind of determinist Marxism as expressed by the principal 
leaders of the Second International, such as Kautsky, as well as by some 
theorists of the Bolshevik revolution, such as Plekhanov and Bukharin. In 
fact, from Kautsky to Stalin, a whole generation of Marxist thinkers had 
supported the argument that the historical process obeyed specific laws of 
necessity, so that it was possible to imagine the transition to socialism as an 
automatic process, inscribed in history. The masses of workers were de fac-
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to deprived of their subjectivity in the revolutionary process. Such interpre-
tation of Marx's historicism in an evolutionary key presupposes the histori-
cal irrelevance of class action carried out by the proletarian masses.  
Antonio Gramsci, by providing a different interpretation of Marxist theory, 
counters the automation of evolution with the collective will of the masses. 
Not incidentally, Marx himself in his eleventh thesis on Feuerbach states: 
«The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the 
point, however, is to change it» (Marx 1958, vol.2, 405). Gramsci, through 
Marx, emphasizes the human element that realizes itself through the orga-
nized action of civil society. Also Marx certainly risked ending in some 
forms of determinism, by predicting the capitulation of the capitalist system 
under the influence of the contradictions expressed by the system itself; yet, 
in his work, he would always stress the aspect of driving force represented 
by the political consciousness of the masses. Karl Kautsky, on the contrary, 
long considered the guardian of Marxist orthodoxy, offeres a mechanistic 
interpretation of Marx in stating that: «Marx and Engels recognized that 
revolutions are not made at will. They come with inevitable necessity, 
when the conditions which render them necessary exist, and are impossible 
so long as those conditions, which develop gradually, do not exist» (cited in 
Fried, Sanders 1964, 436). Kautsky’s view clearly denies the role of human 
intervention in the historical process, thus rejecting the possibility of histor-
ical alternatives. Such an objectivist theory of history is also central to the 
thinking of Plekhanov and Bukharin in the process of Marxism Bolsheviza-
tion. As Salamini observes (1981, 4-5), «From a theory of capitalism struc-
ture and development, [it] becomes the theory of the creation of new histor-
ical formations, that is, new forms of human organizations and institu-
tions». Gramsci’s aim is, therefore, to restore the unity between political 
theory and praxis.  
Leninism had already represented, in a certain way, a valid response to the 
mechanicism of the Second International, by emphasizing the party’s role 
of political leadership, but had been unable to explain the failure of the re-
volutionary perspective in the West. According to Gramsci, the core of the 
problem does not lie so much in the non-realization of the objective histori-
cal conditions, as in the absence of a subjective realization of the objective 
conditions for social transformation. It is precisely this insistence on the 
subjective elements in Marx's theory that differentiates Gramsci from Le-
nin. According to the Gramscian perspective, social transformation is a fun-
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ction of the creative role of the masses and of their political ability to arti-
culate a revolutionary consciousness. From this point of view, the intellec-
tuals’ role becomes crucial. The Italian philosopher states that «every revo-
lution has been preceded by an intense labor of criticism, by the diffusion 
of culture and the spread of ideas amongst masses of men» (Gramsci 1977, 
12). The basic themes of his writings, therefore, concern the clear rejection 
of mechanistic and economistic interpretations of Marx's doctrine and the 
adherence to a fully historicist and humanist form of Marxism. Marxism is 
for Gramsci not only an economic science, but first and foremost a world-
view that points to an intellectual and moral reform of society. This goal is 
unattainable without the collective will created in political praxis. The 
process of social reformation is, therefore, the result of the historical trans-
formation of the “economic class” into a “historical class” that takes place 
in the dialectical relationship between the masses and the intellectuals. 
Revolution is for Gramsci primarily a process of cultural reform. Therefore 
both intellectuals and the party, interacting with the popular masses, must 
work toward the development of a political consciousness and a collective 
will, corresponding to the elaboration of a historically grounded ideology 
of transformation. If the aim is the revolutionary seizure of power, it is also 
true that the subaltern classes, in order to be successful, must work towards 
creating the conditions for transformation, aiming to be an ideologically 
hegemonic class well before becoming the dominant social group. The so-
cialization of the means of material production is only one aspect of the re-
volutionary process, which must be associated with the socialization of the 
means of cultural and intellectual production. As Buci-Glucksmann ob-
serves (1979), Gramsci’s thought goes beyond the mere culturalistic rein-
terpretation of classical Marxism, and this makes of him a theorist of politi-
cal forms of transition defined by the dialectical relationship between social 
forces. From this point of view, we believe that the Gramscian categories 
can be articulated into the framework of a sociology of political praxis. The 
general sense of political praxis is the affirmation of the collective will, 
which becomes the hermeneutic canon of Gramscian historiography but, as 
Salamini observes (1981, 22), the structure of this praxis «is a dialectical 
unity of objective and subjective elements, of structural and superstructural 
activities, of materialism and idealism. Its major protagonists are the 
masses, the intellectuals, and the party. Its point of direction is the creation 
of hegemony». 
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Charles Tilly, on the other hand, is very attentive to the need to develop hi-
storically rooted social theories. Theories are for him a kind of working 
tool kit whose usefulness can certainly vary, yet, they contains the key to 
loosen recurrent explanatory knots. They provide always useful instruction 
even when they are bad instructions. In fact, «some of those instructions are 
worthless, some are misleading, and some are good. But it is normally bet-
ter to have a bad tool than none at all» (Tilly 1981, 11). Also a bad theory 
can, in fact, suggest useful pathways and produce shared modes for the res-
olution of important issues. In this regard, Tilly makes the example of the 
social differentiation theory developed by Durkheim. Although, he says, it 
has shown its ineffectiveness, it has been a beacon for sociological analysis 
by providing important tools for historical interpretation: 
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, Emile Durkheim elaborated a theory of social dif-
ferentiation and its consequences. The theory includes, among other things, a sort of race 
between differentiation and shared beliefs: If society’s shared beliefs accumulate faster than 
it differentiates, change is orderly; if differentiation  proceeds faster than shared belief, dis-
order (suicide, industrial strife, protest, sometimes even revolutions) results. Durkheim’s 
theory is bad […] it not only generates invalid historical analogies (for example, between 
individual crime and collective protest) but also misstates the causal similarities among situ-
ations (for example, different streams of rural-to-urban migration) that are, in fact, analog-
ous. (ibid.) 
But there are also some good theories. Tilly, in this regard, makes the ex-
ample of the theory of dual power developed by Leon Trotsky. The Russian 
intellectual, in his attempt to explain the social conditions of revolutionary 
phenomena, states that a prerequisite for revolution is the existence of an 
alternative concentration of power in the dominant system of power 
(Trotsky 1965). A sort of counter-government to which people can divert 
their obedience when the existing government demonstrates its incompe-
tence and intolerance. This approach is undoubtedly correct and it proves to 
be not only a good theory but a historically grounded theory. Not by chan-
ce, Trotsky carries out his analysis through a comparative study of three re-
volutionary phenomena, the English Revolution of the seventeenth century, 
the French Revolution of 1789, and the Russian Revolution of 1917. The 
selection of three case studies limits the theoretical domain of Trotsky's as-
sertions since his conclusions are not applicable, as he himself admits, out-
side a context characterized by a strong, autonomous and centralized na-
tional state. Such restrictions on the possibility of extending generalizations 
are in fact the price that all theories rightly accepting the challenge of his-
torical contextualization have to pay. It is evident that the potential role that 
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the social sciences can play in the context of historical research is undoub-
tedly important. Alternatively the social sciences risk becoming a large gal-
lery of theories and concepts relating to completely abstract causal analo-
gies and potentially unnecessary to the understanding of historical and so-
cial phenomena. 
 
2. Against evolutionary sociology and structural-functionalism  
In order to develop their ideas, both scholars react to the theoretical paradi-
gms of their times. Whereas Gramsci, consistent with the evolutionistic 
conceptions of the social science in the nineteenth century, strongly oppos-
es Marxist determinism, Tilly harshly criticizes the functionalist paradigm, 
which is the natural continuation of nineteenth-century evolutionism. In 
particular, Charles Tilly feels compelled to question the approach of Durk-
heim who, with his emphasis on differentiation processes seen as the pecu-
liar traits of modernity, would strongly influence the subsequent develop-
ment of social theory in a functionalistic sense.  
Sociology and Marxism, for Gramsci, have reached a state of stagnation. 
They have abandoned their original ideological function dissolving in the 
positivist framework. Sociology has become the science of the particular, 
engaged in producing detailed descriptions and sterile classifications. It has 
become an a-moral, a-political and a-historical science. It represented an 
attempt to create a method for historical-political science subordinated to 
evolutionistic positivism, an effort to describe and classify historical and 
political facts in accordance with the logic of natural sciences. It therefore 
represents the effort to experimentally obtain the evolutionary laws of hu-
man society, in order to produce predictions on the future of humanity. Yet, 
Gramsci observes, sociological laws have rarely had a causative signific-
ance, yet they risk falling into tautology by describing an event or a series 
of events and, through a mechanical process of abstract generalization, they 
risk turning a mere relationship of similarity into a law (Gramsci 1977a, 
PN11, 159-163). 
Actually, everything is born from a need, which Gramsci does not hesitate 
to define «somewhat childish and naïve» way to solve the practical prob-
lem of the predictability of historical events. Since the natural sciences se-
em to have the ability to predict the evolution of natural processes, also so-
ciology has been regarded as scientific only when it was able to predict the 
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future of society, thus going back to the essential cause of socio-historical 
events. But even Marx, in his Thesis on Feuerbach, has the opportunity to 
criticize this simplistic concept, because in the human world only «strug-
gle» may reasonably be expected, not its concrete moments that are usually 
the result of conflicting forces, not reducible to some static quantities, be-
cause, inside them, quantity continuously becomes quality (ibid., 173). 
Obviously, Gramsci’s knowledge is limited to the sociology developed by 
classical theorists such as Montesquieu, Comte, Spencer and Durkheim. 
The conditions of their approach are essentially based on the belief that so-
ciety, despite the diversity of cultural forms and social organizations, obeys 
an essential and objective order recognizable in a body of laws that bind 
certain structural elements in a harmonious whole. The task of sociology is, 
therefore, to identify those social relations that take place in such order. But 
the problem about the concept of science lies for Gramsci in understanding 
whether and to what extent it can offer “certainty” of the objective existen-
ce of reality outside the subjects. According to Gramsci, scientific work has 
two fundamental aspects: one that constantly rectifies the world of knowle-
dge by developing complex principles of induction and deduction, and ano-
ther one that uses this complex instrumental apparatus to distinguish what 
is necessary from what is arbitrary, that is transitional. Within this logic, all 
that is determined by all men, and therefore independent from the point of 
view of any individual or group, becomes objective. Yet, also this certainty 
is actually a world vision, therefore ideological. Objectivity is a non-sense 
if we think of it in absolute terms, while its value increases in its relation-
ship with real social conditions. It is a unifying but not always absolute ele-
ment. 
Scientific truths are never final. Otherwise, science itself would cease to e-
xist as such to become an extension of the already known. Therefore, even 
science is nothing but a historical category, that is, a movement in constant 
development that does not allow any form of «metaphysical unknowable», 
thus reducing the unknown to a simple «non-knowledge», which also 
means «not yet known». If we accept this assumption, what matters in 
science is not so much the objectivity of reality but the men who devise 
their research methods and rectify their material means of detection and 
discrimination through the mediation of technology. Considering science as 
the basis of life, as a worldview par excellence that places man in the face 
of reality as it is, is still a mistake, because science itself is an ideology, e-
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ven if in the world of superstructures it plays a privileged role, due to the 
particular importance, the widet extension and the continuity of develop-
ment that its reaction has on the structure. (ibid., 68).  
Some say that Gramsci comes to a complete formulation of the philosophy 
of praxis also through a systematic critique of the Marxist positivism of 
Bukharin who, in his Historical Materialism: A System of Sociology, clear-
ly expounds his deterministic conception based on the belief of the exis-
tence of laws of historical necessity (Bukharin 1921, en.tr. 1965). Accord-
ing to Gramsci, Bukharin’s is a vulgar interpretation of Marxism in which 
the concept of the dialectical development of history disappears. Whereas i-
dealist philosophy focuses on metaphysical categories, in Bukharin's socio-
logy, ideas are replaced by empirical, as well as abstract and a-historical, 
canons and classifications. For Bukharin, economic processes operate re-
gardless of the human will and therefore, according to Gramsci, outside 
history. By eliminating the dialectical relationship between economic pro-
cesses and human consciousness, Bukharin dismisses the active element in 
the historical processes of the collective will. For Gramsci, instead, laws 
are always tendential laws, in the sense that they do not reveal what is fixed 
and immutable but always trends and possibilities. From this point of view, 
the deterministic Marxism of Bukharin becomes fatalistic, thus sanctioning 
the inertia of the masses and their subordination to historical regularities. 
For Gramsci, on the contrary, Marxism does not condemn the masses to a 
condition of cultural liability but aspires to human emancipation achieved 
through the adoption of a critical and historical methodology. 
Whereas positivist Marxism emphasizes a certain historical mechanicism 
by eliminating the role of politics in the process of social transformation, 
for Lenin, the Russian Revolution demonstrates the ability of politics to 
produce mobilization and transformation. By supporting the primacy of 
politics, he actually supports, like Gramsci, a certain dialectical relationship 
between economic structure and ideological superstructure. From this pers-
pective, Gramsci focuses on the role of the superstructures, following the 
approach outlined by Lenin. He does not downsize the historical role of 
economic structures; rather, he restores a proper balance between economic 
processes and political processes. The relations of production no longer act 
in the wake of general and autonomous laws; they are regulated and altered 
by human consciousness. The economical moment of social consciousness 
constitutes the negative phase, a sort of «realm of necessity» in the ascend-
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ing process of the subaltern classes toward a hegemonic situation, which 
instead represents the positive phase, that is, the «realm of freedom» (see 
also Nardone 1971). In reality, Gramsci develops and overcomes Leninist 
thought by focusing more on the element of cultural and ideological rather 
than on political hegemony. According to him, certain superstructural ele-
ments, such as social awareness, culture, ideology represent both a tool and 
an aim of the revolutionary process. In this sense, the concept of «hegemo-
ny» is equal to that of ideological and cultural direction. The proletariat 
must become the ruling (that is hegemonic) class well before becoming the 
dominant class (Gramsci 1977b). The supremacy of a social group in fact 
manifests itself as «domination» and as «intellectual and moral direction». 
This group can and have to exercise a role of leadership before gaining 
power. From this point of view, Gramsci is aware that the Russian revolu-
tionary experience is not exportable to the West, where no transformation 
process can be separated from the consent of the masses. In this sense, an 
ideological revolution acts as a precondition of the political (and social) 
revolution (see Portelli 1972). 
What is needed in the West is the formation of a «historical bloc» deter-
mined by an organic unity between structure and superstructure, in the 
sense that the complex set of ideological superstructures is a reflection of 
the social relations of production. Between the two elements there exists a 
need for reciprocity, which is precisely the real dialectical process (Gramsci 
1977a, 48). The historical bloc is not a sort of amalgamation or alliance be-
tween different classes, but a hegemonic situation in which social cohesion 
is ensured by a new conception of the world (superstructural dimension) 
and a dominant social group (structural dimension). In this context, the 
dominant power of a given social group is not guaranteed by violence and 
by the monopoly of the means of production, but mainly by a more subtle 
process of gaining consensus in relation to other social groups. What seems 
to be of interest to Gramsci is not so much the organization of class rela-
tions, but the mechanisms through which this organization is created and 
perpetuated (Tamburrano 1969). Only through the establishment of a new 
intellectual order, subaltern social groups can be de-alienated. In this con-
text, Antonio Gramsci’s humanist and historicist conception is consolidat-
ed, and his philosophy of praxis becomes pure humanism, that is, a kind of 
dialectic anthropology in which knowledge is reduced to historical social 
relations that are political and ideological. For Gramsci, humanism corres-
ponds, therefore, to the process of structuring human knowledge on the ba-
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sis of the organized will of men. Rather than “nature”, people are “con-
sciousness” that develops through practical activity within a given histori-
cal context of organized social relations.  
The sociological impact of these problems is evident. Gramsci de facto ap-
proaches a historical and humanist sociology of knowledge where there is a 
complete subordination of social phenomena to the critical consciousness 
of the masses (Gallino 1970; Pizzorno 1970). He agrees with the materialis-
tic principle of the social (and structural) determination of knowledge, but 
he is also convinced that this knowledge, while reflecting objective histori-
cal conditions, cannot be objective in the same way. Historical objectivity 
is in fact achieved through an intersubjective consensus among men. In this 
sense, objectivity is always humanized and historicized. Only through a 
historical analysis it is possible to demonstrate objective reality, always 
seen as «humanly objective» or «historically subjective», where the con-
cept of objectivity is declined as a «universal subjective». In fact, «man 
knows objectively in so far as knowledge is real for the whole humankind 
historically unified in a unified cultural system». But this process of histor-
ical unification can only occur if the internal contradictions afflicting socie-
ty disappear, as they are a precondition for the establishment of social 
groups in the struggle for hegemony through the development of different 
philosophical and ideological systems. «There is then a struggle for objec-
tivity (to get rid of the partial and fallacious ideologies) and this fight is the 
same struggle for the cultural unification of mankind». It therefore seems 
clear that there can be no objectivity that is free of man, as stated in a cer-
tain metaphysical materialism. «We know reality only in relation to man 
and, since man is also historical development, knowledge and reality are 
also a historical development, and also objectivity is a development» 
(1977a, PN11, 181-182). 
The same attention to the processes of organization and mobilization of the 
proletarian masses and the same criticism of a certain sociological mecha-
nicism is recognizable in the work of Charles Tilly. According to him, the 
analysis of social change undertaken up to date, with rare exceptions, are 
mostly contaminated by theories and concepts developed in the nineteenth 
century. Yet those scholars came to build their intellectual equipment thro-
ugh a careful observation of the social reality in which they were immer-
sed, characterized by profound demographic changes, by changes in modes 
of production and ways of organizing power. They focused on the concept 
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of  “differentiation” understood as a dominant social process in the modern 
era, and developed conceptions of society largely organized around the idea 
of a delicate balance between the dynamics of differentiation and integra-
tion. According to Tilly, social sciences should adopt a new toolbox that 
can enrich our understanding of large-scale structures and social processes, 
leaving behind the kind of architecture used to understand intellectual 
structures and processes of a bygone era.  
He undertakes this difficult path by wondering if and how the comparison 
between places, peoples, cultures and between social structures and 
processes over time may give a contribution to this ambitious intellectual 
mission. He analyzes a dense historical and sociological literature focusing 
on the comparative analysis of wide socio-historical structures and process-
ses with the aim of demonstrating the inadequacy of old concepts and clas-
sical theories for an understanding of contemporary societies. First, he 
wonders what qualifies the concept of differentiation: undoubtedly the typ-
ical dynamics of modern urbanization, occupational specialization, expand-
ing markets, widespread forms of education and in general all those proces-
ses that seem to create the conditions for an increasingly clear distinction 
between human beings. Second, he wonders what qualifies the concept of 
integration instead: in this regard, sociological literature refers primarily to 
a sense of similarity between individuals of the same society that originates 
from shared beliefs and traditions, from respect for authority, the genera-
lized fear of any form of moral deviance and, generally, from all those cul-
tural habits (and attitudes) that encourage individuals to reproduce the ex-
isting social structure (and system of power). According to this dichotomic 
perspective, if the various and inevitable processes of differentiation do not 
correspond to a boost directly proportional to the process of integration, the 
way is clear for various forms of social disorder which, on a small scale, 
can take the form of popular violence, madness, immorality, and crime, 
while, on a large scale, it can be expressed through different historical for-
ms of rebellion, insubordination, and conflict. It seems clear that this em-
phasis on the concept of social order has been instrumental in reproducing, 
even in the social sciences, a certain model of society. «A victory of diffe-
rentiation over integration produced a threat to bourgeois security» (Tilly 
1984, 4). In sociology, this knowledge gives strength to the great dichoto-
mies that have been proposed by the classics of social thought: status and 
contract, society and community, primary and secondary groups, mechani-
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cal and organic solidarity. Each of these formulas displays the theoretical 
tension between differentiation and integration. 
A superficial reading of the massive social changes occurred in the nine-
teenth century, in Tilly’s view (1984, 11-12), resulted in at least eight «per-
nicious postulates» that gripped twentieth-century social thought. These as-
sumptions are based on the following principles: 1) «society is a thing 
apart», in the sense that the world is divided into several societies that have 
more or less autonomous cultures, power structures and socio-economic 
structures ; 2) «social behavior results from individual mental events» va-
riously conditioned by life in society; in this sense, the explanation for so-
cial behavior is reduced to an analysis of the impact of society on individu-
als; 3) «social change is a coherent general phenomenon» and, therefore, it 
can be explained as a whole, as if it were a monolithic block; 4) «the main 
process of large-scale social change leads distinct societies through a suc-
cession of standard stages», each stage is more advanced than the previous 
one; 5) «differentiation forms the dominant, inevitable logic of large-scale 
change»; 6) «the state of social order depends on the balance between 
processes of differentiation and processes of integration or control», mean-
ing that, when social differentiation is too rapid or excessive, it tends to 
produce disorder; 7) «a wide variety of disapproval behavior – including 
madness, murder, drunkenness, crime, suicide, and rebellion – results from 
the strain produced by excessively rapid social change»; 8) «illegitimate or 
legitimate forms of conflict, coercion and expropriation stem from essen-
tially different processes» of change and disorder on the one hand, and of 
integration and control, on the other.  
Since no society can exercise total social control, these eight postulates en-
compassing the complexity of social beliefs, are for Tilly the result of mis-
judgements, and, most importantly, social behavior is not (or at least not 
exclusively) the result of the impact of society on the minds of individuals, 
but the result of the relationship between individuals and social groups. So-
cial change is not quite a coherent and comprehensive process, but a useful 
general term to describe a series of interrelated processes. And, finally, sta-
ge theories of social change «disappear at the first observation of the real 
social life» (ibid.). These fallacious beliefs have led to the development of 
an artificial division between the social forces that push towards order (so-
ciety, integration, satisfaction, legitimate control, progress, normality) and 
social forces that push towards disorder (individual mental events, disinte-
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gration, tension, violence, decadence, abnormality). It is a dichotomic and 
Manichean framework that serves to affirm the fragility of social order and 
the consequent necessity and justification for forms of control and repres-
sion. It de facto expresses «the will of the power-holders – actual or would-
be – to improve the people around them, by means of coercion and persua-
sion, at a minimum cost» (ibid., 13). But if this theoretical framework is ac-
tually inappropriate to grasp historical and social phenomena,  besides hid-
ing a clearly ideological substrate, how should we act to improve the logic 
and the tools of social analysis? Tilly has no doubt: «We should build con-
crete and historical analyses of the big structures and large processes that 
shape our era» (ibid., 14). Such analyses should not be abstract, but con-
crete, rooted in time and space, and they should be historical, that is, tem-
porally limited to a specific era that inevitably affects the sequence of 
events and social behavior. Of course, stating that the eight postulates are 
wrong (or pernicious) is not enough; we need to explain the reasons why 
we say so. It is therefore worthwhile to explain this position.  
The great achievement of sociology as an academic discipline has been 
based on the belief in the existence of a separate reality called “society”. 
Only the configuration of an intellectual entity distinct from any other 
could justify the existence of a body of specialized researchers, thus confer-
ring on the discipline its substantial autonomy as a “science of society”, 
separate from all other sciences, particularly philosophy. Based on these 
premises, the scholars of the nineteenth century devised a discipline that 
had its own method, its own epistemology and a full conceptual apparatus. 
The same spirit would later originate a sort of division of labor among 
scholars who claimed to belong to one of the many disciplines that could be 
somehow related to the polyhedric system of the social sciences. In particu-
lar, the sociological task was to study modern and affluent societies. This 
aim, however, prompted social scientists to outline mostly fictitious struc-
tures and processes, starting with the totally artificial distinction between 
state and society, where society is anything that the state is not, even if en-
closed in the geopolitical boundaries of a state.  
The difficulties lie, in fact, in the very attempt to establish the boundaries 
of this delimited system called society. Is it really possible to identify these 
boundaries and, in particular, to ensure that they remain stable over time 
and space? How is it possible, inter alia, to determine these boundaries? As 
Tilly observes (ibid., 23), we cannot guarantee a priori that the boundaries 
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existing between nation-states or certain local communities will also mark 
the boundaries of interpersonal relationships, of a specific production sys-
tem, of a delimited system of shared beliefs and, in general, of all those as-
pects that give meaning to an experience in society. Yet, without this guar-
antee, «the idea of a society as an autonomous, organized, interdependent 
system loses its plausibility» (ibid., 25). Rather, it would be convenient to 
abandon the idea of society as an autonomous system by adopting the alter-
native idea of «multiple social relationships», some of which are made on a 
local scale (from state to community), others on a global scale.  
With reference to the second postulate, namely, that social behavior is 
largely determined by mental events, Tilly argues that it is undoubtedly 
convenient to think of the cognitive (individual) dimension as closely re-
lated to social life, or even as the crucial dimension to explain social beha-
vior itself. Based on this conviction, it becomes easy to group individual 
consciousnesses into a single global mindset. Twentieth-century research-
ers relied heavily on this postulate. This is demonstrated by the increasing 
use of research techniques  making use of questionnaire which provide sta-
tistical distributions of individual mental attitudes aggregated in social 
structures. Yet these research methods could be misleading because they 
generally confuse individual orientations with the sociologically relevant 
element of “social ties”. Life in society is not an expression of the sum of 
social atoms, but of a multitude of relationships, which should then divert 
attention to the construction of substantial informal social networks. Of 
course, Tilly comments (ibid., 27), the individual human being does exist 
and has its own specificity, in the sense that every individual social actors 
perceive their belonging to a network and their participation in various 
forms of relationship in different ways. Social relations are nothing but ab-
stractions of multiple interactions between individuals. Yet, that is precise-
ly the point: we don't make abstractions from individual behavior, but from 
a set of individual behaviors that simultaneously involve two or more social 
actors.  
The third postulate is based on the belief that social change is essentially a 
coherent phenomenon. Nevertheless, Tilly observes, it would be really 
amazing to discover that a single and recurrent social process has histori-
cally governed the same logic of change on a large scale. The point is that 
social scientists don't have to explain some specific regularity such as the 
acceleration of falling bodies or the movement of celestial bodies. In the 
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social world, constantly uniform dynamics that can be explained, do not ex-
ist. Of course, «Many large-scale processes of change exist; urbanization, 
industrialization, proletarianization, population growth, capitalization, bu-
reaucratization all occur in definable, coherent ways. Social change does 
not» (ibid., 33). 
The fourth postulate is grounded in the notion of a sort of social evolution 
based on a succession of stages. «Social scientists once used stage models 
of social change as freely as blacksmith use their hammers» (ibid., 41). The 
various theories of modernization, of economic and political development 
are formulated by referring to such interpretative scheme, which is so effec-
tive at the organizational level of logical thinking, as it is flawed and mis-
leading at the level of a concrete analysis of the processes of social change. 
It is based on an evolutionary macro-theory that wedges historical devel-
opment in artificial mechanisms and in a progressive logic that is actually 
much less uniform than the one intended in prevailing sociological frames.  
The idea underlying the fifth pernicious postulate, that differentiation alone 
can be identified as a kind of master process from which all others descend, 
is similarly misleading. The development of naturalistic and evolutionistic 
conceptions undoubtedly urged this belief, which, even in the nineteenth 
century, seemed justified by the occurrence of certain phenomena, such as 
social complexity, the increasing division of labor, the expansion of mar-
kets, which were easily ascribable to mechanisms of differentiation. All so-
cieties seemed destined to stumble along the same conceptual and organiza-
tional path that goes from simple to complex. Only the most diversified so-
cieties seemed destined to survive. Even Talcott Parsons, who at an early 
stage of his intellectual activity seemed to depart from certain evolutionist 
models, ended up embracing them. In 1937 he began his famous work, The 
Structure of Social Action, with a quote from Crane Brinton: «Who now 
reads Spencer? […] We have evolved beyond Spencer» (Brinton 1933, 
226-227, quoted in Parsons 1937, 1). Parsons is therefore convinced that 
the Spencerian approach based on the idea of unilinear evolution, following 
an utilitarian and positivistic scheme, is to be considered definitely out-
dated, and nevertheless, at the end of his intellectual career, he seems to 
explicitly recall the concept of organic evolution. As he writes in an essay 
within a text specifically dedicated to comparison in the social sciences: 
If human “history” consisted of a population of essentially unique “cultures”, as has been 
alleged, this consideration would indeed virtually eliminate the relevance of “comparative 
method”. But empirically, this simply is not the case; history consists rather, like the system 
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of organic species, of an immensely ramified “inverted branching tree” of forms at many 
levels of system reference. 
What ties the “branches”, forms, and levels together into a macro-system, is in the first in-
stance common genetic origin. This is to say that differences among subsystems have, by 
and large, arisen through processes of differentiation from what in some sense have been 
“more primitive” forms. The human socio-cultural universe is by no means so variegated as, 
at least superficially considered, the organic seems to be, but it is by no means narrowly 
constricted (Parsons 1971, 102) 
Also Parsons, in the above passage, besides recovering a clear evolutionist 
approach, embraces the idea of differentiation seen as the dominant social 
process. Tilly’s (1984, 48) criticism of this postulate should not be unders-
tood as a denial of the importance of the process of social differentiation in 
socio-historical development. In his view, this awareness cannot be crystal-
lized, thus hiding a reality that is also characterized by significant dynamics 
of de-differentiation, as clearly demonstrated by the various aspects of phe-
nomena that have been conceptualized under the term “globalization”. Ac-
tually, we cannot speak of a master process from which the others arise. 
The historical development is so complex and varied that any attempt to 
identify a dominant distinctive element would risk, as often happened, con-
taminating the analysis of concrete historical and social processes.  
This critical consideration brings us to the sixth pernicious postulate  based 
on the assertion of an oppositional dialectic between differentiation and in-
tegration, constituting the grounds on which the game of establishing social 
order would be played. Excessive or too rapid differentiation processes are 
therefore carriers of situations of structural disorder, which can be faced by 
increasing the integrative pressure guaranteed by social control and the 
subsequent repression by the political and moral authority of a given socie-
ty. The result of this postulate is likely to be tautological as it relies on 
propositions such as «differentiation produces disorder whereas is equiva-
lent to the absence of order». Actually differentiation undoubtedly produces 
tensions, but such tensions do not represent necessarily a threat to social 
equilibrium. Let’s think about the dialectical conflict between capital and 
labor. Without it, Western societies would probably not have had a real so-
cial pressure towards democratization that is nothing but the aspiration for 
a new order of solidarity. 
This brings us to the seventh pernicious postulate that is essentially based 
on the “equivalence” of different forms of disorder. Whole generations of 
social scientists, in fact, have seen very different phenomena –  such as 
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crime, family instability, social movements and in general all those beha-
viors disapproved by the classical bourgeois culture – as similar expres-
sions of social disorder. All are explained in terms of a sort of social mal-
function brought about by too rapid changes, whose solution requires in-
tense collaboration between social classes and political analysts. Some 
scholars consider these “problems” as the inevitable cost of social devel-
opment: 
The very fact that modernization entrails continual changes in all spheres of a society means 
of necessity that it involves processes of disorganization and dislocation, with the continual 
development of social problems, cleavages and conflicts between various groups, and 
movements of protest, resistance to change. Disorganization and dislocation thus constitute 
a basic part of modernization and every modern and modernizing society has to cope with 
them (Eisenstadt 1966, 20). 
This approach is clearly misleading because it assumes that an ordered so-
ciety is also a static and non-conflictual society, thus neglecting the role of 
conflict in the production of social change. 
All the postulates highlighted by Charles Tilly, therefore, are based on a 
clear separation between the sphere of order and that of disorder, which, in 
real political application, is reflected in the eighth and final postulate that 
relies on the distinction between legitimate force (that of established pow-
er) and illegitimate force, that is an expression of social disorder. All forms 
of challenge to power, from forms of rebellion to organized social move-
ments, become illegitimate, while phenomena such as war, repression, pri-
son, forms of taxation and, generally, all those phenomena aimed to produ-
ce integration by the dominant power become legitimate. As Tilly reminds 
us (1984, 56), these distinctions are fictitious and analytically impractical 
because the same actions may fall on either side of the demarcation line 
and only a political opinion (ie ideological) separates them. Let’s think of a 
resistance movement against a foreign occupation: the actors involved will 
be considered terrorists by the political elites of the occupying power, and 
heroes of freedom by most of the people who are against the occupation. 
Even theoretically, the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate force 
is likely to be mind-numbing, firstly, because it tends to reinforce the al-
ready refuted idea of the continuing tension between differentiation and in-
tegration, and secondly, because it tends to separate social phenomena that 
have many aspects in common, and that are generated from similar condi-
tions. In reality, the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate use of 
force, at least when forms of collective action are concerned, derives from 
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the forms of historical development of nation-states and from the way pow-
er is organized within them. 
 
3. History meets the social sciences 
The critical sociology of Antonio Gramsci takes shape in the rejection not 
only of positivist Marxism but also of Benedetto Croce’s idealist philoso-
phy. As a theorist of bourgeois liberalism, Croce played in Italy the same 
role Hegel played in Germany (Salamini 1981, 27). The human and histo-
ricist components of Croce's philosophy become a useful conceptual tool 
for Gramsci in his criticism of the Marxist mechanicism of the Second In-
ternational. Although fascinated with Croce’s statement on the historical 
importance of human values, Gramsci clearly distances himself from the 
Italian philosopher on the question of the role actually played by the masses 
in the process of historical determination. Croce's idealism is in fact unable 
to resolve the conflicting relationship between theory and praxis. Accord-
ing to Gramsci, by raising the concrete reality of social conflict to the level 
of ideas, the philosophy of Bendetto Croce becomes an ideological appara-
tus that justifies the existence of abstract, purely speculative and essentially 
a-historica values. When meta-historical values are regarded as absolute 
values, then metaphysics and pure theory take the place of real conflicts 
happening among men. As Salamini observes (ibid., 28), Gramsci's criti-
cism of Croce's idealism can be summed up in four basic points: the con-
cept (and conception) of historicism, the definition of philosophy, the con-
ception of dialectics, and the relationship between theory and praxis.  
Gramsci and Croce seem to agree on the historical and immanent role of 
ideas as well as on their criticism of theories not grounded in historical 
facts, but Croce, unlike Gramsci, gives a metaphysical value to history. 
When Croce says that ideas generate action and that man is the real creator 
of history, he actually refers to a hypostatized, that is, not historically de-
termined, man (Croce 1907, en.tr. 1914; 1915). In Gramsci’s opinion, men 
are the protagonists of concrete struggles, which are structured into real his-
torical processes, by facing the objective reality of social contradictions. If 
for Croce historical creation is reduced to a history of ideas and concepts, 
Gramsci, like Marx, see historical processes mainly as praxis, that is, prac-
tical activity. Ideas become concrete in objective social conditions, and the 
history of science is not metaphysics, but a tool for creating historical con-
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sciousness (Gramsci 1977a). Historicism is therefore understood by Gram-
sci as a kind of awareness of the role of history as an instrument for action 
and mobilization. From this point of view Gramscian Marxism is absolute 
historicism in its aim to reveal the sociological context of ideological sys-
tems (Badaloni, 1967, 101). Even dialectics, in Croce's idealism, is reduced 
to a dialectic between innovation and conservation and, in this sense, it has 
an immediate political impact, even if it represents the absolute negation of 
conflict. According to Gramsci, the conception of dialectics assumes in 
Croce an ideological value in that it excludes any immediate revolutionary 
alternative. The reduction of the real historical dialectic to a conceptual di-
alectic minimizes the role of politics in favor of aesthetics, economics, log-
ic, regarded by Croce as true sciences. Politics, reduced to mere ideological 
passion and ideology, in Croce’ s view, is not philosophy. Croce’s classifi-
cation of pure sciences may be valid, according to Gramsci, only in an uto-
pian society, structurally and epistemologically unified, that is, in a class-
less society without conflicts, which, historically, is a non-sense. In socie-
ties characterized by dialectical conflicts between classes, political passion 
and ideologies become science. The history of philosophy is then, for 
Gramsci, the history of the conflict between alternative worldviews, and in 
this sense, philosophy itself becomes politics and the political science be-
comes the only science capable of resolving social conflicts (Gramsci, 
1977a).  
Gramsci's rejection of evolutionist bourgeois sociology does not dismiss 
the possibility of a sociology placed in the perspective of a philosophy of 
praxis (Gallino 1970; Pizzorno 1970). What Gramsci criticizes is not soci-
ology tout court but the ideological function of positivism and Croce's 
idealism. If sociology would give up the attempt to develop a system of ab-
solute, objective laws, it might give an essential contribution to the under-
standing of the origins and conditions of socio-cultural systems. In fact, 
every society has its own rationality that Gramsci does not deny. Thus, crit-
ical sociology is called upon to find this rationality and replace it with a 
system of rationality for the benefit of civil society. This is, therefore, a so-
ciology of political praxis, a science that analyzes the conditions under 
which subaltern groups are formed, crystallized and work within a given 
historical bloc. Specifically, it has to analyze the historical process of for-
mation of a given collective will (Buzzi 1969; Piotte 1970), starting from 
the awareness that the genesis of any social group is always characterized 
by a certain connection with the means of production, and that the end 
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point is always the political and cultural conquest of hegemony that is a-
chieved when a given social group becomes a unifying and leading force 
also for other social groups. In this regard, the acquisition of a historical 
consciousness, the development of a political and intellectual class, the cre-
ation of new political organizations and worldviews, are for Gramsci the 
most important superstructural elements in a sociological framework.  
At this point, Gramscian sociology coincides with Charles Tilly’s historical 
sociology. According to Tilly, the approaches of sociologists and historians 
to the analysis of social events are different, but there are good reasons to 
try to identify the parameters for a practical synthesis of the two approaches 
based on the need to develop historically grounded social theories. Such an 
effort necessitates our careful reflection on the merits of historical research. 
First, we should restore some conceptual order by affirming the importance 
of the work of historians. There have been, especially in sociology, scholars 
who expressed their conviction of being able to analytically capture social 
cases without knowing their historical origins, namely the specific contexts 
from which these cases emerged. This sociological effect is clear in the fol-
lowing words by Lipset: 
From an ideal-typical point of view, the task of the sociologist is to formulate general hypo-
theses, hopefully set within a larger theoretical framework, and to test them. His interest in 
the way in which a nation such as the United States formulated a national identity is to spe-
cify propositions about the general processes involved in the creation of national identities 
in new nations. Similarly, his concern with changes in the patterns of American religious 
participation is to formulate and test hypotheses about the function of religion for other insti-
tutions and the social system as a whole. The sociologist of religion seeks to locate the con-
ditions under which the chiliastic religion occurs, what kinds of people are attracted to it, 
what happens to the sects and their adherents under various conditions, and so on. There are 
clearly no problems of the historian. History must be concerned with the analysis of the par-
ticular set of events and processes. Where the sociologist  looks for concepts which subsume 
a variety of particular descriptive categories, the historian must remain close to the actual 
happenings and avoid statements which, though linking behavior at one time and place to 
that elsewhere, lead to a distortion in the description of what occurred in the set of circums-
tances being analyzed (Lipset 1968, 22-23). 
As Tilly (1981, 5) observes, the question of the division of labor between 
sociologists and historians, as placed by scholars such as Lipset, is essen-
tially similar to that «between the mycologist and the mushroom collector, 
between the critic and the translator, between the political analyst and the 
city hall reporter, between brains and brawn. History does the transcription, 
sociology the analysis». This is a clear mystification to which, it should be 
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said, historians have often contributed, as we can see from these words by 
Gareth Stedman Jones: 
Attitudes toward sociological theory among sociologically inclined historians have often 
verged on the credulous, and although more critical sociologists might have rejected as 
naively positivist any distinction between history and sociology which sees the one as “idio-
graphic” and the other as “nomothetic”, many of these historians have behaved in practice as 
if they considered such a division of labour to be legitimate. Defensive about their own sub-
ject and repelled by an inadequately understood Marxism which appeared to be the only 
other contender, they have looked uncritically to sociology as a theoretical storehouse from 
which they could simply select concepts most serviceable for their individual needs (Sted-
man Jones 1976, 300).     
History cannot be seen as a kind of failed sociology, as well as historical 
materials cannot be treated as raw evidence waiting to be sociologically 
analyzed. In this regard, Charles Tilly offers a double argument through a 
distinction between «matters of fact» and «matters of principle» (Tilly 
1981, 6). On a strictly factual ground, historians conduct their investiga-
tions following some rules that differ significantly from those governing 
social science research, as well as historical materials generally differ from 
those used in sociology. In terms of principle, it should also be said that any 
analysis of social processes is equally historical. In fact, an analysis is his-
torical only when it takes into consideration the time and the place of the 
action in his explanations. From this point of view, the classic distinction 
between “generalizing” (or nomothetic) and “particularizing”(or idiograph-
ic) disciplines is not adequate. Historical analysis must be characterized by 
the integration of time and space. It is mainly the sociological analysis of 
change on a large scale to have an insufficient historical awareness. There-
fore, sociological theory needs to be grounded in history, that is, embedded 
in time.  
Both sociologists and historians, while following partially different logics, 
cannot refrain from seeking more adequate theories to investigate historical 
and social contexts. To achieve a similar result we should further explore 
the terrain of history. As Tilly observes (ibid., 12), the word “history” re-
fers, at the same time, to a «phenomenon», to «a body of material» and to a 
«set of activities».  
As a phenomenon, history represents the cumulative effect of past events 
on present events. Let us think of the phenomenon of industrialization; 
scholars are divided between those who believe that the processes of capital 
accumulation, economic growth, exploitation of labor force, recur in a 
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number of countries, following more or less the same lines, and those who 
believe that these processes vary depending on the mode of industrializa-
tion of the countries that first initiated the dynamics of accumulation. Only 
the members of the first group can obviously adopt common procedures for 
synchronic comparison, since they assume the irrelevance of the temporal 
dimension; the members of the second group will avoid those forms of 
cross-sectional comparison, paying greater attention to the dynamics of his-
torical development. 
Seen as a set of materials, history appears as a persistent and residual body 
of past behaviors that can be brought to light through old news reports, wit-
nesses’ accounts, autobiographies and other narrative materials that may re-
present a small slice of past experience. Historians have generally focused 
primarily on written evidence, although any remnant of the past, from 
working tools to graffiti left on walls, can constitute a small fragment of a 
past life. 
Viewed as a set of activities, history is an attempt by scholars to reconstruct 
the past. An attempt that, according to Tilly (ibid., 13), is likely to be hope-
less for two reasons, which, after a little reflection, will actually appear ob-
vious. First, the availability of information on the past is likely to be almost 
inexhaustible, exceeding the effective capacity of even the most slavish his-
torian to collect and synthesize them in a comprehensive way. Historians 
are compelled to make a choice by selecting only a small portion of the ma-
terial available to them. Second, historians have to pick just a few of the 
many events occurred in the past, depending on the specific question on 
which the research design is built. Once the objectives of the survey are 
clearly defined, other information that is not closely related to them may be 
deemed irrelevant. In a few words, historical writing is based on the follow-
ing aspects: those who commit themselves to this work specialize in the re-
construction of past behaviors; they rely mainly on narrative texts that 
represent the remnants of the past; they emphasize only selected pieces of 
text taken as the most suitable means to perform the task of reconstruction; 
they consider “where” and especially “when” some specific events are re-
levant for their impact on social life, and may therefore constitute essential 
elements for their own explanation. The fact that the function of historical 
work is easily identifiable, does not mean it will always proceed according 
to an ordered pattern: 
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In reality, the practice of history resembles a zoo more than a herbarium, and a herbarium 
more than a cyclotron. In a Cyclotron a huge, costly, unified apparatus whirs into motion to 
produce a single focused result; history does not behave like that. In a herbarium, a classifi-
catory order prevails; each dried plant has its own niche. Historians divide their subject mat-
ter and their styles of thought into diplomatic, economic, intellectual, and other sorts of his-
tory, but the divisions are shifting, inexact … and often ignored in practice (ibid., 15-16). 
However, stating that historical practice is often methodologically inconsis-
tent and inaccurate, does not mean that historical processes are without 
meaning for the social sciences. Many social-scientific disciplines that have 
developed as if the historical origins of social phenomena were of no im-
portance – particularly anthropology, sociology and political science – feel 
the need of restoring their historical connections. In particular, sociology 
has long perfected its methods in opposition to history and, Tilly points out 
(ibid., 37), by placing itself outside the effort – typical of scholars of the 
nineteenth century – of understanding and controlling the origins and the 
features of industrial capitalism, an effort somehow shared by authors such 
as Marx, Tönnies, Durkheim and Weber. Previous sociologists were pri-
marily concerned to place historical experience within macro-sequences, 
such as Comte’s theory of the «three stages of thought» (theological, meta-
physical and positive), or Spencer’s «evolution theory», according to which 
humanity is engaged in a long historical march on the path of differentia-
tion from a «military stage» to an «industrial stage». With the development 
of sociological practice, especially during the twentieth century, the histori-
cal content of social processes was gradually dried up in the illusory at-
tempt to create a sort of natural (a-temporal) science of society. Only in the 
sixties and in particular the seventies of the twentieth century, eminent so-
ciologists would rediscover a taste for historical connections, especially in 
dealing with important issues such as industrialization, control of forms of 
rebellion and revolution, and family structure. A taste for historical and 
comparative analysis of large-scale processes of change began to spread 
among some social scientists, mainly because of some disappointment over 
the ineffectiveness shown by classical models of modernization and devel-
opment. 
Sociological analysis has often had to undertake the study of history when 
dealing with two areas: first, large-scale structural change, and second, col-
lective action with particular reference to the analysis of social movements, 
rebellions and revolutions. The search for general patterns for the processes 
of industrialization, rationalization or political development brings the 
scholars to make a double effort: on the one hand, they must identify the 
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traits of great processes of change in specific historical periods, and on the 
other, they must connect specific transformations that were taking place in 
those times to the macro-processes of change previously identified. The at-
tempt to formulate some general laws underlying revolutions or social 
movements, therefore, involves the need to find some regularities in collec-
tive action in specific historical periods. According to Tilly (1981, 44), in 
our time, the two macro-processes to consider are undoubtedly represented 
by the expansion of the capitalist system and the development of nation 
states (as well as by the resulting system of states). 
If we agree with this idea, the historical problem we have to face lies in the 
need to determine how and why processes of capital accumulation occurred 
with the resulting dynamics of proletarianization; how and why the system 
of production relations spread, and finally what consequences resulted from 
this expansion. The temporal element here is essential and historical analy-
sis indispensable. Moreover, there is the question of the nation state, un-
derstood as a complex organization in a position to monopolize the means 
of coercion in a specific territory. The nation state is autonomous, centra-
lized, and its lines of internal division are formally coordinated, making it 
different from other organizations working in the same area. From this 
point of view, States are a relatively new phenomenon, since we can detect 
their traces only in the past few hundred years. Even the international polit-
ical context, in Renaissance Europe, was largely characterized by formally 
independent political units, which were far from resembling the system of 
states typical of our times. Modern states can be historically analyzed both 
in their internal dimension, by focusing on the dynamics through which 
some organizations manage to exercise a certain domination over the popu-
lations of a given territory, gradually becoming a State, and in the external 
dimension, by observing how those organizations defend their domination 
against pressure from outside organizations (other States). In both dimen-
sions the question of War becomes crucial. Internally, war pushes rulers to 
exert heavy pressure on their people in terms of taxes, conscription and re-
quisitions; externally, it leads them to pursue war efforts through which 
they can affirm their right to exclusive control over a given territory. 
From this context, emerge the classic questions of political sociology that 
link Gramsci to Tilly: how can the ruling class maintain control over the 
economic life and the political apparatus in a given area? Under what con-
ditions can the population be active, organized and informed with respect to 
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national politics? How are riots, rebellions and revolutions enacted? And so 
on. In this way, we can take the asymmetries of power and participatory 
processes as a historical problem to be connected to the two macro-pro-
cesses represented by the development of states (and the systems of States) 
and the expansion of the capitalist system of production. As Tilly points out 
(1981, 46), state and capitalism provide the framework for a historically 
rooted analysis of collective action and of the ways by which individuals 
act together in pursuit of shared interests. «Instead of the eternal behavior 
of crowds, we study the particular forms of action that people use to ad-
vance claims or register grievances. Instead of laws of social movements, 
we study the emergence of the social movement as a political phenomenon. 
Instead of power in general, we study the modalities of power within a cer-
tain mode of production» (ibid.). In particular, the two macro-processes in-
fluence the direction of change by acting on three fundamental components 
of collective action: the “interests” for which individuals decide to act col-
lectively, their “capacity” to act in defense of those interests, and the “op-
portunity” to advance or defend those interests through the development of 
coordinated collective action. 
 
 
4. Historical comparison as a sociological instrument 
Antonio Gramsci’s historical sociology cannot disregard the use of compar-
ison as a privileged instrument of knowledge. As above mentioned, he is 
interested in understanding the reason why, in Italy, a revolution on the So-
viet or Jacobin model is impossible. His interpretation, the result of a care-
ful comparative analysis, can be ascribed to the role of intellectuals and to 
the structure of civil society. 
Gramsci distinguishes between organic and traditional intellectuals. The 
first are those whose origins coincide with those of the social group they 
wish to represent. They are defined according to the functions conferred on 
them by the social group from which they originate in economic and politi-
cal, as well as cultural and ideological spheres. Organic intellectuals repre-
sent a function of the interests of a class, but also an instrument of social 
transformation. Traditional intellectuals, on the other hand, seem to be the 
expression of an uninterrupted historical continuity. Their raison d'être is 
based on the autonomy of their past and on the need to reproduce their 
caste-like position in contemporary society. What really defines traditional 
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intellectuals is the dialectically negative response to new social groups. 
Their autonomy is in direct opposition to the progressive aspirations of 
emerging social forces. At this point, for Gramsci, the central issue beco-
mes a comparative analysis of intellectual blocs within concrete historical 
blocs, as were those emerged in European societies. In particular, his focus 
is on the bourgeois hegemonic capacity in France, Italy, England and Ger-
many. 
In France, the central element of the struggle of the bourgeoisie against the 
landed aristocracy is represented by the contrast in terms of superstructure 
between bourgeois organic intellectuals and the Church. In that context, a 
progressive bourgeoisie was able to erode the feudal economic and institu-
tional structures, giving rise to a capitalist mode of production. Such a 
structural process would not have happened if it had not been accompanied 
by an ideological movement opposing those traditional intellectuals who 
had found in the ecclesiastical institutions their strongest allies. The tactics 
of the bourgeoisie were meant to get rid of traditional intellectuals and, at 
the same time, to assimilate them. In this way, the French bourgeoisie were 
able to build a new historical bloc impermeable to repeated attempts at res-
toration. 
In Italy, instead, the bourgeoisie began to form around the eighteenth cen-
tury, that is the era of medieval municipalities and city-states. Although 
they tried on various occasions to displace the political domination of the 
aristocracy, they were never able to transcend their corporate stage to beco-
me the hegemonic social group. The bourgeoisie  failed in the attempt to 
create their own organic intellectuals capable of addressing the power of 
the Church as well as traditional intellectuals. The failure of the Italian 
bourgeoisie led to the formation of small states ruled by the old aristocracy, 
thus blocking for several years the process of modernization. The same 
process of the Italian Risorgimento, which would take place almost a cen-
tury after the French Revolution, would be led by moderates able to exert a 
strong power of attraction also towards democratic intellectuals close to the 
Action Party. The Italian middle class has always remained an elite and 
therefore it has never sought the consent of the masses which, according to 
Gramsci, constitute the only possibility to ensure a real process of social 
transformation. 
In England, middle class patterns of development differs from the French 
and the Italian cases. Here the bourgeois revolution was accomplished 
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through a fusion of old and new hegemonic groups. The old aristocracy re-
tained certain formal privileges, becoming the intellectual stratum of the 
new bourgeoisie. In this context, the new staff of the ruling bourgeoisie was 
also formed by elements of the old feudal classes who participated in the 
process of building new forms of economic power in the industrial and fi-
nancial world. Thus, what made the dialectic between progressive and tra-
ditional intellectuals possible? Gramsci suggests a line of research. At the 
economic-corporate level, the English bourgeoisie created a stratum of or-
ganic intellectuals who tried to exorcise their own weakness by incorporat-
ing the old landed aristocracy within State administration. 
The industrial development in Germany has some aspects that are similar to 
the English pattern. Here, too, the middle class emerged from an almost 
feudal social context by using the dynamics of fusion between old and new 
hegemonic groups achieved through a clear division of roles. The German 
bourgeoisie assumed the role of industrial and economic direction, leaving 
the role of intellectual and political direction to the old Junker aristocracy. 
Like in England, the bourgeoisie was not able to produce an organic intel-
lectual class that would be strong enough to assume a hegemonic role by 
itself. 
According to Gramsci, the French, English and German cases are three 
models of bourgeois revolution carried out in the strategic conflict between 
traditional and organic intellectuals. He contrasts these cases with the fail-
ure of the Italian bourgeoisie focusing mainly on the comparison between 
Jacobin France and the Italian Risorgimento. 
All the problems inherent in the connection of the different currents in the 
Italian Risorgimento may be ascribed, for Gramsci, to the fundamental fact 
that the moderates represented a relatively homogeneous social group, so 
their political leadership underwent limited fluctuations, while the Action 
Party didn’t support any historically determined social group, so that the 
oscillations of its ruling class were eventually shaped by the interests of the 
moderates. In fact the supremacy of a social group can manifest itself in 
two ways: either in the form of «domination», or in the form of «intellec-
tual and moral direction». A social group tends to “dominate” the opposing 
groups and seeks to wipe them out through military force, while it tends to 
“lead” similar or allied groups. A social group, however, must be able to 
exercise leadership even before winning governmental power. After gain-
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ing power, that group becomes dominant, but it must also be able to main-
tain its ruling position. 
The political history of the moderates during the Italian Risorgimento 
proves the truth of this assumption. They were the ruling class well before 
being the dominant class and this allowed them to rise to power by exerting 
hegemonic force with no need for excessive material force. In this sense, 
the Risorgimento in Italy was organized in the form of a «revolution with-
out revolution», that is a «passive revolution» (1977c, PN19, 87-88).  
The moderates were able to establish their hegemony by adopting “liberal” 
means, that is, through individual initiative at a molecular level, thus with-
out a party program developed according to a plan that precedes action and 
organizational practice. The field of the moderates was made up of intellec-
tuals who had already well developed their organicity to the social groups 
of which they were the expression. They were intellectuals, politicians and 
business managers  and, at the same time, big farmers, entrepreneurs and 
industrialists. Given these conditions, they exercised a great «spontaneous» 
power of attraction on the whole body of intellectuals of any rank. From  
this context, Gramsci claims, emerges the methodological consistency of a 
criterion for historical-political research: «There is no independent class of 
intellectuals but each social group has its own class of intellectuals or tends 
to form it; but the intellectuals of the progressive class, in the given condi-
tions, exercise such a power of attraction that ultimately they end up mak-
ing subaltern the intellectuals of other social groups, and then by creating a 
system of solidarity with all the intellectuals through psychological (vanity, 
etc.) and often caste-like ties (legal-technical, corporate, etc.)» (1977c 
PN19 88-89). 
This is accomplished in an almost spontaneous way when a social group 
assumes the features of a progressive class which enables the entire society 
to advance. When this social group ceases to fulfill its function, the entire 
ideological bloc that supports it tends to crumble, and spontaneity can be 
replaced by direct or indirect coercion, that is, through real police action or 
military coups. 
In the context of the Risorgimento, the Action Party, because of its articula-
tion was unable to exert such a power of attraction, therefore, it was itself 
subjected to attractions and influences, so much so that it was hesitant 
about accepting in its program some crucial popular demands, as such as 
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the agrarian reform. The Action Party, steeped as it was in the rhetoric tra-
dition typical of a certain Italian literature, tended to confuse the cultural 
unity existing in the peninsula – limited, however, to a very thin stratum of 
the population mainly polluted by Vatican cosmopolitanism - with the terri-
torial and political unity of the popular masses which were unconnected to 
that cultural tradition. For this reason, in Italy, the political action of the 
Actionists never reached the efficiency levels attained, for example, by the 
Jacobins in France. They fought in order to create a link between  cities and 
countryside, and their defeat at some point in the historical development 
was due to the fact that they clashed with the demands of the Parisian 
working class, yet their long rhetoric tradition would continue in the modal-
ity practiced by Napoleon and, in a certain sense, by Herriot’s and Daladi-
er’s radical-socialists. 
The different interpretations of the Jacobin experience are not right on tar-
get. The very term “Jacobinism” has come to assume two meanings: the 
first, historically characterized, is that of a political party which sees the 
development of French life in a specific way and is based on a particular 
program; a party which performs its action through an energetic and reso-
lute method derived from the occasionally fanatical belief in the soundness 
of that program (and that method). Hence the notion that a “Jacobin” is an 
energetic, determined and fanatical political man, confident in the miracul-
ous virtues of his ideas. In this view, the sectarian element prevails on the 
awareness of a movement that succeeded in giving voice to the major de-
mands of the popular masses connecting them with the element of national 
politics. 
Actually, the Action Party, according to Gramsci, in order to really assume 
the character of a progressive group, should have been “Jacobin”, not only 
in its external form of temperament, but also in its economic and social 
contents. In this way, the connection of the rural classes - which in Italy 
was realized by a reactionary bloc formed by clerical-legitimists intellectual 
classes - could also lead to the formation of a new liberal and national polit-
ical force. But in order to do so, the Actionists should have accepted the ba-
sic demands of peasants by appealing to them and to the intellectuals of the 
lower strata of society. 
The Jacobins conquered their function of ruling party through a strenuous 
fight. They imposed themselves on the French bourgeoisie leading them 
towards advanced positions. They exploited the situation by creating irre-
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versible facts, «by hunting out the middle-class kick in the pants». The 
“Third state” was in fact the less homogeneous. It was made up of a disin-
tegrated intellectual elite and an economically advanced but politically 
moderate social group. At first, its political action was limited to claims re-
garding corporate interests. Therefore, the forerunners of the Revolution 
were moderate reformers. In a relatively short time, however, a new elite 
came into existence that tended to see the bourgeoisie as a group exerting 
hegemony over all the popular forces. This was the result of a selection 
process that took place through the action of two factors: the resistance of 
traditional social forces and the international threat, two elements that 
without the vigorous and determined action of the Jacobins would have 
crushed the Third state. 
The Jacobins opposed any intermediate halt in the revolutionary process, 
by physically eliminating not only elements of the old society but also 
moderate revolutionaries, who had by this time become reactionary. There-
fore, on the one hand, the Jacobins represented the only revolutionary rul-
ing party to represent the aspirations of the immediate (and corporate) 
French bourgeois interests; on the other hand, they represented the revolu-
tionary movement as a complete historical development, since they encom-
passed also the future needs «of all national groups that had to be assimi-
lated to the existing fundamental group». 
They were without doubt as convinced of the validity of the rhetoric formu-
la «freedom, equality and fraternity» as popular masses were. «The lan-
guage of the Jacobins, their ideology, their methods of action perfectly re-
flected the needs of the time» even though today they might seem too “fre-
netic”. Their first need was to destroy enemy forces or reduce them to im-
potence in order to prevent the emergence of counter-revolutionary forces. 
Secondly, they posed the problem of enlarging middle class cadres by plac-
ing them at the head of the national forces, thus creating a political-military 
relationship favorable for the revolution, and by limiting liability in areas 
where enemy forces could recruit their own army. Rural France was 
brought to accept the hegemony of Paris, realizing that the old regime had 
to form a bloc with the most advanced forces of the Third state, marginaliz-
ing the Girondins who represented the soul of moderation. Even if at one 
point the Jacobins forced their hand too much, they did it in the very sense 
of historical development. They not only organized the bourgeoisie but 
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made them the dominant and, at the same time, the ruling class, able to ex-
press a thoroughly bourgeois state. 
The real problem of the Jacobins is that, until the end, they remained on a 
purely bourgeois ground, even when historical conditions were ripe for a 
further leap in quality. They refused to recognize the right of coalition to 
workers, continuing to enforce the Chapelier law. In this way, they broke 
the urban bloc of Paris and their assault forces were dispersed, bringing 
with them a feeling of disillusionment and disappointment. «In fact the 
Revolution had found the wider class limits. The politics of alliances and of 
the permanent revolution had ended by asking new questions that could not 
be resolved then, it had unleashed elemental forces that only a military dic-
tatorship would be able to contain» (1977c, PN19, 104-107). 
The reasons why a Jacobin party never emerged in Italy are to be found in 
the socio-economic fabric, that is, in the historical weakness of the bour-
geoisie in the Peninsula. The result was that the supporters of the Italian Ri-
sorgimento were never able to arouse the enthusiasm of the masses and, for 
that reason, they did not fulfill any of the planned objectives. They obtained 
just «the miserable political life since the 70s to 900, the elementary and 
endemic rebellion of the working classes, the crude and stunted existence 
of a skeptical and idle ruling class (ibid., 117). 
Tilly is very interested also in the dynamics of contention in France, as well 
as in the rest of Europe, between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, 
and devotes to the topic countless publications through which he perfects 
his theory of collective action that is now so well known to scholars of po-
litical sociology and social movements that it does not need further discus-
sion (among the most illuminating texts, we should recall, Tilly 1964, 
1978; Shorter, Tilly 1974; C. Tilly, L. Tilly and R. Tilly 1975). We are in-
terested in the methodological approach that begins with Tilly’s criticism of 
the dominant sociological paradigms to claim the need for social theories 
rooted in time and space and monitored by a constant recourse to historical 
comparison. 
Having identified the eight postulates that tend to distort the sociological 
reading of historical and social processes, we must understand how they 
can be uprooted. On this point, Tilly proposes two approaches, a direct and 
an indirect approach. In the first case, it is necessary to “fight” the post-
ulates on their own ground by observing the same logic that led to the de-
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velopment of certain statements about the distinction between legitimate 
and illegitimate violence, or about the differentiation process as a master 
frame of social change. We must then compare them with actual historical 
cases trying to identify alternative readings. In the second case, which is 
closely connected to the first, it is necessary to look for forms of generali-
zation that are rooted in historical processes. In this sense, we do not need 
to pursue universal statements, more or less confirmed by a variety of in-
stances occurring in different places and at different times; rather, we need 
to connect a set of specific cases and variables to different periods and con-
texts, linking together similar cases, being always aware of their space and 
time limits. It is at this point that historical comparison becomes crucial to 
describe and explain structural dynamics and large processes. 
The analysis of structures and processes is conducted, according to the sys-
tematization provided by Tilly, at four historical levels: 1) at a «world-
historical level», the researcher's task is to identify the specific properties of 
an era, contextualize and fix them in the flow of human history. At this lev-
el, for example, we can find the different patterns of social evolution, the 
rise and fall of empires, the development and entrenchment of specific pro-
duction patterns; 2) at a «world-systemic level», the researcher's task is to 
discern connections and changes in the most important part of a broad set 
of interrelated social structures; 3) at a «macro-historical level», the re-
searcher must give an account of structures and processes also mentioning 
their alternative forms in graphic form; and 4) at a «micro-historical level», 
the researcher's task is to trace the connections of individuals and groups 
with such structures and processes, in the hope of being able to explain 
their impact on social life (Tilly 1984, 60-61). 
Structures and processes are deemed relevant, therefore, depending on the 
level of analysis. At a world-historical level, the structures on which the at-
tention of the researcher is focused are those generally ascribable to the 
category of world-system, while the relevant processes are related to the 
transformation and the historical sequence of systems understood in their 
entirety. At this level, any discourse on the processes of urbanization, indu-
strialization and state-building would be inappropriate, as it would occur at 
a lower level than the wholeness of the world system. If a researcher choo-
ses to operate at this level, any comparison, if necessary, should be based 
on a comparison between world systems and, as Tilly states, «My eyes fal-
ter and my legs shake on this great plan» (ibid., 63). 
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At a historical systemic level, the dimension of world system continues to 
have its importance even if, in this case, the scholar  focuses on those 
world-system components that are based on networks of coercion and/or 
exchange. In the first case, the focus is mostly on the dimension of the na-
tion state understood as a more or less centralized, differentiated and auto-
nomous organization that has the capacity to control the means of coercion 
within a limited geographical area. In the second case, the researcher focus-
es on the patterns of production at a national or regional level, in particular, 
on the set of relationships between geographically segregated and interde-
pendent individuals and groups that have certain factors of production. In 
this case, the most important processes are those related to the dynamics of 
production, distribution and subordination. The comparison is here in-
tended to establish similarities and differences between networks of coer-
cion and exchange, as well as between processes of subordination, produc-
tion and distribution. At this level, Tilly points out, any attempt at generali-
zation is dangerous, controversial and difficult to verify. 
With the macro-historical level, according to Tilly, «we enter the ground of 
history as historians ordinarily treat it» (ibid.). Within a given world sys-
tem, we can certainly build states, modes of production, army associations, 
enterprises, networks, by gradually giving body to our unit of analysis. At 
this level, processes such as proletarianization, accumulation of capital, ur-
banization, state-building, bureaucratization are suitable for our analysis. In 
this case, the comparative measure is based on a comparison between these 
units, through which structural and procedural uniformity, variations and 
combinations can be identified. Their systematic study in specific macro-
systems fully falls within the logic of a historically rooted analysis that 
should be taken as the foundation of our cognitive activity. 
This should not lead us to underestimate the dimension of micro-history. 
When we analyze the impact of structures and processes on individuals and 
groups, we will necessarily draw a connection between personal experience 
and historical process. In this case, the frames of reference concern the rela-
tionships between individuals and social groups while processes are related 
to the transformation of the relations between individuals connected to 
those structural dynamics. If the researcher works at a micro level, any dis-
tinction between interactions and relationships will lose some of its mean-
ing. Comparisons between systems of relationship and their transformation 
take shape and consistency in the close link between those systems of rela-
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tionship and structural and procedural dimensions. In other words, the rela-
tionship between capitalists and workers makes sense only within the 
broader historical process of proletarianization and concentration of capital. 
Charles Tilly, among the four levels of analysis, prefers to dwell on the 
comparisons conducted at the macro-historical level and particularly on 
that borderland which is realized in the connection between macro- and mi-
cro-historical dimensions. 
Our objective is to identify a comparative approach able to account for the 
structures and processes that take place within a specific world system, so 
as to produce some limited – i.e., historically determined – generalizations. 
Since we aim to identify some regularity in such historical structures and 
processes, we do not need to analyze a large number of statistically treated 
instances. Comparative analysis of socio-historical processes and structures 
is most fruitful when we focus on a limited number of instances and «that is 
not because of the intrinsically greater value of small numbers, but because 
large numbers give an illusory sense of security» (Tilly 1984, 77). In the 
analysis of a small number of instances, the researcher has the opportunity 
to focus on the historical circumstances and the specific characteristics of 
each case, in order to identify some common features needed for compari-
son. 
Even if we abandon society as our unit of analysis, it does not mean that we 
must abandon also the dimension of nation state; what we need is an 
awareness that our points of reference are a territorial area and a population 
controlled by the state institutional system and not a thing apart, as stated in 
the first pernicious postulate. Of course, researchers have some alternatives, 
meaning that, instead of the State, they can select different units of analy-
sis, such as entire blocs of international powers, cities or city networks, re-
gional modes of production, social classes, and so on. What is important for 
researchers is to have a clear idea of the objects of their analysis, before 
they produce any theoretical proposition. 
Tilly distinguishes between different ways of comparing big structures and 
processes by classifying the different propositions one can potentially draw 
through comparative analysis. To do so, he combines two dimensions of 
comparison: one based on the «sharing of all instances» and one that is 
based on a «multiplicity of forms». The first dimension refers to those ac-
counts that emerge from a comparison ranging from the analysis of a single 
event – aimed at highlighting the specific features of the case itself – to the 
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analysis of more instances – intended to bring out the characteristics of all 
the cases considered. The second dimension refers to those accounts that 
emerge from a comparison ranging from single – when all cases of a phe-
nomenon have common properties – to multiple – when there are different 
forms of a phenomenon. By combining the two dimensions, four possible 
approaches to comparison emerge: «individualizing», «universalizing», 
«variation-finding», and «encompassing» comparisons. Individualizing 
comparisons are those that treat each case as essentially unique by mini-
mizing the significance of any property in common with other cases. Purely 
universalizing comparisons, in turn, are based on the identification of 
common properties in all cases. On the other hand, we have those types of 
comparisons that are based on the search for possible variations (variation-
finding) and, in particular, on the belief that we can establish a principle of 
change in the nature or intensity of a phenomenon starting from a system-
atic analysis of the differences between a number of instances. Encompass-
ing comparisons are instead based on the analysis of different instances in 
different places within the same macro-system. The purpose of this form of 
comparison is to explain the characteristics of each case in the light of an 
evolving relationship with the system as a whole. 
 
5. Contentious politics and democratic process 
At the end of our comparative study, we can suggest some reflections on 
the thoughts of our two authors. Within the scope of this work, we have to 
leave out the specific studies conducted by Gramsci and Tilly, to concen-
trate our attention on their approaches and in particular on those aspects 
where we can find significant evidence of connection. We have seen that 
both authors assume an analogous  starting point in their criticism of 
mechanistic and evolutionistic sociology in order to support the need for an 
analysis of social phenomena understood in their specific historicity. Both 
authors regard contentious politics as the central dimension in the process 
of historical development and, therefore, as a vital element of sociological 
interest. 
Tilly’s intellectual agenda is absolutely historical. His main objective is to 
understand how collective action evolved in Europe under the influence of 
major structural changes such as the processes of industrialization, urbani-
zation and, in particular, the two macro-processes represented by the devel-
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opment of the mode of capitalist production and the emergence and con-
solidation of nation states. Within the broader category of collective action, 
he focuses on the practices of public, confrontational and sometimes vio-
lent mobilization. His main focus is on the practice of uprising against eco-
nomic and political power holders within national or regional communities. 
As Lynn Hunt points out(1984, 246), «Tilly emphasizes the creativity of 
the ordinary people, their ability to organize themselves and to defend their 
interests». The dimension of the interests is, in fact, central to the theory of 
Tilly and represents a discriminating factor in the conceptualization of col-
lective action that he defines, in general terms, as the practice by which 
«people acts together in pursuit of common interests» (Tilly 1978, 7). 
In order to implement his theoretical and empirical project, Tilly is forced 
to react to the functionalist approach of Durkheimian matrix by starting a 
dialogue with Marx as well as with Marxist theorists. He himself admits 
that since he began his long investigation into the practices of conflict, pro-
test and collective action, his main purpose has been the accumulation of 
sufficient empirical evidence to refute the Durkheimian line, with particular 
reference to the concept of anomie and the dichotomy between integration 
and disintegration, through which contentious collective actions ended up 
being relegated to the broader category of social deviance (Tilly 1981, 95-
108). This leads him to approach the Marxian elaboration without fully 
embracing it. He himself, in one of his most famous works, describes his 
analysis as «resolutely pro-Marxian» (1978, 48), agreeing with the atten-
tion paid by Marxists to the dimension of the interests rooted in the organi-
zations of production and in the practices of conflict rather than of consent.   
Tilly, however, goes beyond Marx, by placing his attention not so much on 
proletarians as such, but on those movement organizations on which their 
activism and the success of their mobilization depend. Moreover, Tilly, al-
though following Marx in his concern for the developments of production 
models, does not limit his study to this aspect, he takes into consideration 
also other relevant structural processes such as urbanization and the forma-
tion and consolidation of nation states. This last element brings him slightly 
closer to the tradition of Weberian studies. Finally, unlike Marx and Gram-
sci, Tilly rarely focuses on the concept of class consciousness, turning his 
attention to the combination of interests and organization. What finally dis-
tinguishes Gramsci from Tilly is the attention for the theoretical dimension. 
Both strongly believe that no study design can be successfully pursued wi-
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thout reference to a theoretical framework firmly rooted in historical proc-
esses. But, whereas Gramsci has no doubt in identifying the crucial points 
of this framework in the Marxist tradition which, freed from certain deter-
ministic propensities, is configured in the parameters of the philosophy of 
praxis, Tilly, being inspired by all major sociological theoretical traditions, 
never refers to a single paradigm. In Tilly’s view, in fact, theory is a fun-
damental research tool that is subject to change. It can be a helpful guide-
line for a socio-historical investigation; the evidence of real historical proc-
esses, however, should never be constrained in static conceptual cages. 
Theories, if we refer to them, should always be dynamic and, to a certain 
extent, flexible. 
Even Gramsci, while claiming its full adherence to Marxism, opposes any 
form of structuralist orthodoxy and focuses mostly on the historical role of 
ideological superstructures, as well as on the importance of intellectual or-
ganization in the process of transformation, starting from the structural 
conditions determined by the relations of production. The organization of 
conflict against hegemonic systems of power is the focus of interest for 
both authors (in particular, see Tilly, Tarrow 2007; and Tilly 2007) who, 
through their proposal of historical comparison as a tool for social analysis, 
present themselves as supporters of a historical sociology of political proc-
esses in a dynamic path toward democracy understood, first of all, as a 
process of conflict between power holders (economic and political) and 
subaltern social groups. 
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